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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
CaseNo.20000889-CA
Priority No. 2

TARA KAY MAST,
Defendant/Appellant.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The federal constitutional guarantee of due process, the Utah constitutional right to
appeal, and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999) prevent the imposition of afineand attorney's
fees upon Appellant Tara Kay Mast ["Ms. Mast''] in the event that this Court determines that the
restitution portion of her original sentence exceeded statutory limitations. The imposition of a
fine and attorney's fees would add two new elements to Ms. Mast's sentence that were absent
from her original sentence. This addition is expressly prohibited under cases interpreting Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999). State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179,181 (Utah 1981); State v.
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 73, 979 P.2d 799. It also violates state constitutional guarantees. State v.
Babbel 813 P.2d 86, 87-88 (Utah 1991). Further, if this addition is justified on the basis that Ms.
Mast's ability to endure it has increased because of her successful appeal of the restitution
portion of her original sentence, undertones of vindictiveness are strongly suggested and this is
a direct violation of Ms. Mast's federal due process rights. North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S.
711, 725-26 (1969). Therefore, the State's argument that afineand attorney's fees should be
imposed upon Ms. Mast in the event that this Court determines that the restitution portion of her

original sentence was illegal should be rejected.

ARGUMENT
FINES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD NOT BE REINSTATED IN THIS
CASE BECAUSE THE REINSTATEMENT WOULD RESULT IN A HARSHER
SENTENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. AND
UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-3-405
The State attempts to circumvent established authority by arguing that this Court should
instruct the sentencing court to reinstate previously-suspended fines and attorney's fees in the
event that the restitution order is vacated. However, such an instruction would violate
constitutional and statutory protections which prevent courts from imposing harsher sentences,
or increasing the number of elements of sentences, after successful appeals by criminal
defendants.
The federal constitutional guarantee of due process, U.S. Const, amend. V, extended to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, prevents a sentencing court from imposing a harsher
sentence upon a defendant after appeal unless vindictiveness against a defendant for having
successfully appealed plays no part in the sentencing. North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 711,
725 (1969). In North Carolina v. Pearce. the United States Supreme Court observed that, "since
the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to
appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process [] requires that a defendant be freed
of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge." Id Due
process does not prevent the imposition of a harsher sentence in all cases, but it requires a
sentencing judge to base such a sentence upon "objective information concerning identifiable
conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing
2

proceeding." Id. at 726 (emphasis added). This information must be included in the record so
that it may be fully reviewed on appeal. Id,
In Utah, the imposition of a harsher sentence after appeal is even more suspect because
the Utah Constitution contains two provisions protecting a criminal defendant's right to appeal.
State v. Babbel 813 P.2d 86, 87 (Utah 1991). Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution
protects the fundamental right of criminal defendants to appeal,1 and Article VIII, section 5
guarantees appeals as a matter of right from all courts with original jurisdiction.2 With regard to
these provisions, the Utah Supreme Court has held that:
The purpose of an appeal is to promote justice by ferreting out erroneous
judgments. That purpose is not promoted by imposing on a defendant who
demonstrates the error of his conviction the risk that he may be penalized with a
harsher sentence for having done so. An erroneous judgment of conviction is as
much an affront to society's interest in the fair administration of justice as it is to
an individual's rights.
Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88 (quoting Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980)).
Even more stringent than the Utah constitutional protections is the protection provided by
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999). This Court has recognized that "[s]ection 76-3-405
unambiguously provides that when a conviction or sentence is set aside on appeal, the trial court
cannot impose a new sentence that is more severe than the prior sentence." State v. Maguire. 924
P.2d 904, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).3 Recently, the Utah Supreme Court has reiterated that "[t]he
1

Utah Const, art. I, § 12. The full text of this provision is provided in Addendum A.

2

Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5. The full text of this provision is provided in Addendum B.

3

Section 76-3-405(1) provides that:

Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense
or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than

meaning of a "more severe' sentence is clear. xThe second sentence cannot exceed thefirstin
appearance or effect, in the number of its elements, or in their magnitude."' State v. Bakalov,
1999 UT 45, % 73, 979 P.2d 799 (quoting State v. Sorensen. 639 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981)). "It
also precludes justifying an increase in one element of a sentence by reference to a decrease in
another element.... This is because the possibility of such a tradeoff could act as a deterrent to
appeal by an individual defendant." Sorensen, 639 P.2d at 181.
Several cases decided under section 76-3-405 are directly on point. In State v. Bakalov,
the Utah Supreme Court disallowed the imposition of a fine, in addition to prison time, where
the original sentence imposed prison time only. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^ 74. Even more pertinent
is State v. Sorensen. There, the Utah Supreme Court vacated a second sentence requiring a
defendant to serve 1 to 15 years in prison where the original sentence of 1 to 15 years had been
suspended by the sentencing court. Sorensen. 639 P.2d at 180-81. In that case, the State
attempted to justify the second sentence by pointing out that the original sentence had included
two years of probation with the conditions that the defendant serve six months in the county jail
and pay full restitution of approximately $45,000. Id. Because the second sentence did not
impose these conditions, the State argued, the cumulative affect was not greater than the original
sentence. Id. at 181. The Court rejected that argument, stating that under section 76-3-405 uno
new element of sentence can be added and that no element can be augmented in magnitude." Id.
This Court has agreed. In State v. Maguire this Court vacated a sentence for consecutive prison
terms where the original imposed concurrent terms. Maguire. 924 P.2d at 907. In that case, this

the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(1) (1999).
4

Court emphasized that "[t]he plain meaning of section 76-3-405 indicates that a court is barred
from ever resentencing an individual to a harsher second sentence following a successful
appeal." LI 4
Here, the imposition of fines and attorney's fees would add two new elements to Ms.
Mast's sentence that were not there before. Previously, 180 days of jail time, probation, and
restitution was imposed upon her, and the other elements of the sentence were suspended. R. 4547.5 If this Court determines that the restitution order exceeds statutory limitations, then the
imposition of previously-suspended elements of the sentence cannot be justified on the basis that
Ms. Mast's ability to endure these elements has now increased because of the reversal of an
illegal restitution sentence. It is precisely circumstances such as these that lead to a chilling
effect on criminal defendants' rights to appeal, and constitutional and statutory provisions
prohibit this. See Sorensen. 639 P.2d at 181 (State cannot justify an increase in one element of a

4

In a distinguishable case, State v. Mitchell, this Court upheld a sentence imposing a
term of 1 to 15 years, a consecutive term of 1 to 5 years under an enhancement provision, and a
fine where the original sentence had imposed life in prison only. State v. Mitchell. 824 P.2d 469,
472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This Court acknowledged that "there could be tradeoff of elements,
such as an increase in one element of a sentence by reference to a decrease in another element."
Id. However, this Court reasoned, the enhancement and fine had not been available by statute at
the time of the defendant's original conviction and so the second sentence was permissible. Id.
This Court noted that "[a]t the time defendant was convicted of manslaughter (his second
conviction), the trial court imposed the maximum statutory penalties for the offense. The trial
court did not trade elements off between the first and second sentences." Id.
Mitchell is distinguishable from the case at bar because there has been no change in
section 75-3-201 since Ms. Mast's original conviction. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-201 (1999).
Further, because this appeal focuses upon Ms. Mast's sentence and not her conviction, the
possibility for conviction of a different crime is not available, and so no new elements or facts
will be available for consideration at a second sentencing.
5

The original sentence suspended the prison term, the fine, and attorney's fees. R. 45-46,
70 [13]. The court ordered Ms. Mast to serve 180 days in jail, placed her on three years of
probation, and required her to pay restitution in the amount of $5,090. R. 45-47, 70 [9].
5

sentence by reference to a decrease in another element because "the possibility of such a tradeoff
could act as a deterrent to appeal by an individual defendant"); Maguire, 924 P.2d at 906 (under
the federal constitutional due process clause a harsher second sentence cannot be derived from
vindictiveness toward the defendant for exercising his right to appeal because this would "'chill
the exercise of basic constitutional rights . . . .'")(citation omitted)).
The State argues, however, that:
If this court determines that the sentencing court erred in requiring restitution for
losses occasioned by the theft of items not received, the restitution order will be
reduced from $5090 to $440. Should the sentencing court reimpose the fine and
recoupment fee, the court would require defendant to pay a total of $1660, far less
than the original restitution order.
Appellee Br. 16. Thus, the State argues, the sentence would be "clearly and measurably less
harsh than the original." Id. at 18.
However, this reasoning is a classic example of "justifying an increase in one element of
a sentence by reference to a decrease in another element...," and is impermissible under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (1999). Sorensen. 639 P.2d at 181. Additionally, it violates Ms. Mast's
due process rights under the federal constitution because it is not based upon "identifiable
conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing
proceeding." Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726 (emphasis added). It also tramples Ms. Mast's Utah
constitutional rights to appeal because it imposes a harsher sentence upon Ms. Mast through a
fine and attorney's fees that were not previously imposed. See BabbeL 813 P.2d at 88 ("The
purpose behind these [constitutional] provisions is to prevent the chilling effect on the
constitutional right to appeal which the possibility of a harsher sentence would have on a
defendant who might be able to demonstrate reversible error in his conviction."). In short, the
State's argument ignores established constitutional, statutory, and case law in order to secure an
6

alternative punishment for Ms. Mast in the event that an original method is found to be illegal.
This argument has undertones of vindictiveness, and as such it is absolutely prohibited by
constitutional and statutory provisions. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725; Sorensen, 639 P.2d at 181.
Moreover, the State's calculation with regard to the reduction in restitution which would
occur if Ms. Mast is successful on appeal is inaccurate. Although the State does not indicate how
it calculated its figures, Appellee Br. 16, the calculations are apparently based upon information
from the Presentence Investigation Report regarding losses from the burglary of Curtis Belnap's
house. R. 72 [4]. The Report indicates that the $5,090 in restitution which Ms. Mast was ordered
by the trial court to pay breaks down as follows:
Item Stolen in Burglary

Value/Replacement Cost

Checks

$40

Two days lost wages

$400

Large water bottle w/money

$3,500

Two stereo speakers

$ 1,100

Day planner

$50
TOTAL LOSS: $5,090

Id. The State argues that the restitution order would be reduced to $440 in the event that this
Courtfindsthe restitution exceeds statutory limitations. This apparently includes the
replacement cost of the checks, $40, and two days' lost wages, $400. However, these items
should not be included. Ms. Mast pled guilty to Theft by Receiving and admitted that she had
been in the possession of four rings and a pocket watch. R. 17. These items were returned. R. 71
[9]. The replacement value of the checks is not attributable to Ms. Mast because she did not
admit to being in possession of all of the stolen checks. Additionally, there is no indication that
7

Mr. Belnap's lost wages were the result of Ms. Mast's crime of Theft by Possession, and not the
result of the burglary itself. Thus, the restitution should not be reduced to $440, as suggested by
the State, but to $0 because Ms. Mast has returned the property which she was in possession of.
R. 71 [9].6

CONCLUSION
In light of the above, the State's argument that afineand attorney's fees should be
reinstated in the event that this Court determines that the restitution imposed upon Ms. Mast
exceeded statutory limitations should be rejected.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Hit

day of May, 2001.

H^HERJd^MNSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JARED W. ELDRIDGE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

6

Additionally, even if $440 was attributable to Ms. Mast, the total amount of the fine and
attorney's fees, in addition to the $440 is $1,640, and not $1,660, as indicated by the State.
Appellee Br. 16. This is based upon afineof $1,000 and attorney's fees of $200. R. 45-47.
8
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ADDENDUM A

Art. I, § 12

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid
because it delegates to industrial commission
the power to hear, consider and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246,194 P. 122
(1920).
Dependents of employee killed by acts of
third party, a stranger to employment, are not

limited to recovery under Workmen's Compensation Act exclusively, unless they have assigned their rights to insurance carrier Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P 9
(1927).
Cited in Wrolstad v Industrial Comm'n, 786
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248.
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next
Move — Due Process? 1971 Utah L. Rev. 266.
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275.
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev.
319
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 47.
Recent Developments m Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990
Utah L. Rev. 129.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §§ 613 to 617.
C.J.S. — 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§§ 1428 to 1437.
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state

criminal trial in order to preserve confidentiality of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Exclusion of public from state criminal tnal
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55
A.L.R.4th 1196
False light invasion of privacy—defenses
and remedies, 57 A.LR4th 244
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or otherwise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57
A.L.R.4th 404
Libel or slander defamation by statement
made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520
Defamation: designation as scab, 65
A.L.R.4th 1000
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfering with prospective civil action, as actionable,
70 A.L.R.4th 984.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law
<*=> 322, 324, 327, 328.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants,
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6.
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ADDENDUM B

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Art. VIE, § 5

Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts —
Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
History: Const 1896; L. 1943, S.J.R. 2;
1984 (2nd S.S.), S.J.R, 1.
Compiler's Notes. — Provisions similar to
those in this section were formerly found in
Art. Vm, Sees. 7, 8 and 9.

Cross-References. — Original and appellate jurisdiction, § 78-3-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Appeal by the state in criminal cases.
Appeal where case originated in circuit court.
Appeals.
City court supervision.
Defendant's right to appeal.
District court jurisdiction.
—Appellate.
—Original.
Divorce decree.
Equity as distinguished from law case.
Extraordinary writs.
Final judgment.
Habeas corpus.
Invoking jurisdiction.
Juvenile court supervision.
Legislative enlargement or abridgement of
powers.
Review in cases at law.
Review of evidence in equity cases.
Right to appeal.
Summary appellate disposition.
Temporary restraining orders.
Cited.
In general.
Although district courts of this state are
courts of original jurisdiction, having jurisdiction in all matters both civil and criminal
which are not excepted by law or the Constitution, one district court has no power to exercise
control over another. Nielson v. Schiller, 92
Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365 (1937).
Appeal by the state in criminal cases.
This section does not grant the state a general right of appeal in criminal cases. State v.
Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977).

Appeal where case originated in circuit
court.
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to entertain
appeals from district court decisions where the
case originated in a circuit court and involved
a constitutional issue; Supreme Court's jurisdiction was not limited, as is its jurisdiction
over appeals from a district court decision
where the case originated in a justice court, to
cases involving the constitutionality or validity of a statute. State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439
(Utah 1983).
Appeals.
The district courts of this state had appellate
jurisdiction insofar as entertaining appeals of
decisions rendered by board of registration of
trades and professions revoking license of physicians. Baker v. Department of Registration,
78 Utah 424, 3 P.2d 1082 (1931).
District judge who was called to another district to try a case did not have jurisdiction to
settle bill of exceptions in his home district.
Jenkins v. Forsey, 83 Utah 527, 30 P.2d 220
(1934).
Right to appeal is valuable and constitutional right and should not be denied except
where it is clear that right has been lost or
abandoned. Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah
52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947).
City court supervision.
District court had subject matter jurisdiction
over misdemeanor assault and battery prosecution; jurisdiction over the person was conferred
by accused's stipulation that case might be
transferred from city court to district court and
his appearance in latter court; fact that prosecution was initiated by complaint rather than
indictment or information did not preclude district court jurisdiction. Jardine v. Harris, 63
Utah 560, 227 P. 1029 (1924).
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